Stacey Properties v. Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler v. J. Ron Stacey : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Stacey Properties v. Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen,
Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler v. J. Ron Stacey :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert M Anderson, William P Schwartz; Hansen & Anderson; Attorney for Appellant.
Clark Waddoups, Ronald G Russell; Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups; Attorneys for
Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stacey Properties v. Wixen, No. 880127.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2050
U i « n v / v u n i w r **i-v~ *»#-*•.** 
BRIEF 
JTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
A10 ^ ^ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOCKET NO. •r'Qtaii-CJl 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Appellant and 
Cross Respondent, 
v. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER and BONNIE GOLER, 
Respondents and 
Cross Appellants, 
v. 
J. RON STACEY, an individual, 
Additional 
Cross Respondent. 
88-0127-CA 
No. 860527 
BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENTS 
Robert M. Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Cross Respondents 
Clark Waddoups 
Ronald G. Russell 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
185 South State Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Cross Appellants 
n**, 
r LED 
APR 3 01987 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utab 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Appellant and 
Cross Respondent, 
v. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER and BONNIE GOLER, 
Respondents and 
Cross Appellants, 
v. 
J. RON STACEY, an individual, 
Additional 
Cross Respondent* 
No. 860527 
BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENTS 
Robert M. Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Cross Respondents 
Clark Waddoups 
Ronald G. Russell 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups 
185 South State Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Cross Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Cross-Appeal 1 
1. Stacey' s Warranties 1 
a. The Air Conditioning Unit 1 
b. The Post Office Roof 3 
Summary of Argument 4 
A. The District Court Damage Awards... 4 
Regarding the Post Office Air Conditioner 
and Roof Resulted in Windfalls to the 
Cross-Appellants. 
B. Section 17 of the Letter Agreement 6 
Does Not Entitle Cross-Appellants to an 
Award of Their Attorneys1 Fees. 
Argument 7 
I. Cross-Appellants Were More Than Adequately 7 
Compensated By the District Court's Awards 
Relating to the Post Office Air Conditioner 
and Roof. 
A. The District Court Abused Its 8 
Discretion By Awarding Respondents a 
Percentage of the Cost of Replacing the 
Post Office Air Conditioner. 
B. The District Court Applied 12 
an Unjust Standard to Arrive at 
Staceyfs Share of the Cost of 
Replacing the Post Office Roof. 
II. Section 17 of the Letter Agreement Does Not 14 
Entitle Cross-Appellants to an Award of 
Their Attorneys1 Fees. 
Conclusion 16 
- I -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 11 
(Utah 1982) 
Clayton v. Crossroads, 655 P.2d 1125.......... .....7 
(Utah 1981) 
J.R. Stone Co., Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 11 
1285, 1288 (Utah 1978) 
Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Division, 581 P.2d... 7 
603, 610 (Wyo. 1978) 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287, 291. 7 
(Utah 1982) 
Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 11 
800, 803 (Utah 1981) 
Tibbets v. Openshaw, 425 P.2d 160, 161-62, 8 
n. 1 (Utah 1967); 
Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 16 
(Utah 1984) 
Annot. 97 A.L.R.2d 849 8 
- ii -
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO CROSS-APPEAL 
Stacey does not disagree with cross-appellants' 
statement of the case or statement of facts except as 
discussed below. 
1. Stacey's Warranties: 
Cross-appellants have neglected to point out the 
following extremely important provisions contained in the 
first page of the letter agreement: "The properties have 
been inspected by you and are purchased "as is." (Letter 
Agreement at p. 1, included in addendum to Appellant Stacey 
Properties' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Stacey's Opening 
Brief") as Exhibit "C"). 
Additionally, the following facts are relevant to this 
Court's analysis of the propriety of the damage awards 
relating to the post office air conditioning unit and the 
post office roof. 
(a) The Air Conditioning Unit. 
(i) Stacey warranted only that the cooling 
systems at the post office were in "working order" and 
"operative" at "closing." (Letter Agreement at p. 2); 
(ii) The date of closing was May 22, 1984. (TR-
45); 
(iii) Cross-appellants knew that the air 
conditioning units at the post office were "used," yet 
had no inspections performed on them prior to closing 
and did nothing to insure that the air conditioning 
units were properly serviced prior to their spring start 
up. (TR-457; Deposition of Francine Wixen at pp. 
92-94); 
(iv) Post office personnel started the air 
conditioning units for the season either on May 19, or 
May 26, 1984, without checking the oil or refrigerant 
level. (TR-112; 134); 
(v) There is no direct evidence that the 
subject unit (hereinafter the "east unit") was not in 
working order or operable on the date of closing, May 
22, 1984. (See TR-112; 168); 
(vi) On May 29, 1984, post office personnel 
observed for the first time that the east unit was not 
working. (TR-112; Exhibit D-7); 
(vii) On June 22, 1984, the Holbrook Company 
inspected the east unit and found that the oil safety 
switch had been "tripped," shutting down the unit 
because the unit was low on refrigerant and was leaking 
oil. (TR-171-73; 179); 
(viii) On June 26, 1984, the Holbrook Company 
repaired the east unit at a cost of $1,030.32. (TR-175; 
181); 
(ix) After the Holbrook repairs on June 26, 
1984, the problem with the east unit was "corrected" and 
the unit was operable. (TR-139; 166; 175-76; 181; 218; 
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Exhibit P-25a; Exhibit D-7). 
(x) There was no evidence that the east unit 
was not operable after the June 26, 1984 repair until 
July 25f 1984. (See TR-140; 219); 
(xi) On or about July 30f 1984, cross-appellants 
determined to replace the existing 15-ton east unit with 
a 20-ton air conditioning unit, at a cost of 
approximately $21,500.00. (TR-212-13; Exhibit D-16, 
:
 * D-17); \'X' "^'s-
(xii) At no time did respondents ever request 
Stacey to perform or pay for repairs to the east air 
conditioning unit prior to its replacement. 
(TR-402-403); 
(b) The Post Office Roof. 
The letter agreement contained several different 
warranties relating to the roofs on the various properties 
sold by Stacey: 
(i) In regard to Eastern Winds and the Pizza 
Hut, Stacey warranted that the roofs were "free of any 
defects in workmanship and material" and that Stacey 
would repair the roofs as required for five years due to 
any defects in workmanship or material. (Letter 
Agreement, p. 2); 
(ii) In regard to the Commonwealth Square roof, 
Stacey made the same warranty as was made for Eastern 
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Winds and the Pizza Hut, but only for a one year 
period. (Icl.); 
s (iii) In regard to the post office roof, Stacey 
made no warranty whatsoever relating to the condition of 
the roof, but merely agreed to "perform all necessary 
t repairs which were reasonably required to maintain a 
water tight roof surface for a period of sixty-seven 
months from the date of closing." (Id.); 
Additionally, cross-appellants "assumed" that the roof 
on the post office was the original roof and that it was 
approximately thirteen years old when they purchased it 
(TR-452). 
Finally, although the roof leaked periodically, Stacey 
always responded to and fixed the leaks, generally on the 
same day the leak was reported. (TR-144). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Damage Awards Regarding the 
Post Office Air Conditioner and Roof Resulted in Windfalls 
to the Cross-appellants. 
Contrary to cross-appellants1 argument that the 
district court failed to compensate them adequately 
regarding the post office air conditioner and roof, the 
district court improperly awarded cross-appellants a 
windfall. 
In regard to the air conditioning unit, Stacey 
warranted only that the unit was in working order and 
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operable on May 22, 1984. There is simply no evidence that 
such was not the case. Additionally, the air conditioner 
was repaired and made operable by the Holbrook Company on 
June 26f 1984 at a cost of $1,030.32. Therefore, if 
respondents are entitled to any damages at all for the air 
conditioning unit, they are only entitled to the $1,030.32 
they spent to place the unit in working order. To hold 
otherwise would be to expand the scope and duration of 
Staceyfs warranty, or to make cross-appellants more than 
whole for Staceyfs breach of its limited warranty. 
In regard to the post office roof, Stacey made no 
warranty concerning its life span or condition. Rather, 
Stacey agreed only to perform repairs "reasonably required" 
to maintain a water tight roof surface for sixty-seven 
months. Stacey responded to and repaired all leaks on the 
roof, although leaks were a recurring problem in the spring 
due to the age of the roof. Respondents incurred no 
expenses on the roof. 
Although Stacey disagreed that the roof needed to be 
replaced, it recognizes that the recurrent leaking problems 
placed respondents in a difficult position with the post 
office. Therefore, replacing the roof was desirable under 
the circumstances. The district court properly concluded 
that respondents were entitled to recover from Stacey a 
percentage of the replacement cost because Stacey had 43 
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months remaining on its repair obligation from which 
respondents could no longer benefit. However, the district 
court erred in failing to calculate Stacey's share of the 
replacement cost utilizing the remaining period of Staceyfs 
repair obligation (43 months), and instead utilized the full 
period under the agreement (67 months). That miscalculation 
resulted in a windfall to respondents. 
B. Section 17 of the Letter Agreement Does Not 
Entitle Cross-Appellants to an Award of Their Attorneys' 
Fees. 
The promissory note contains no provision for the award 
of attorneys fees or costs to cross-appellants for their 
enforcement of their rights under the note. Therefore, 
cross-appellants have no right to recover any expenses or 
fees incurred in enforcing their right to offset provided in 
the note. 
The only provision in the letter agreement relating to 
attorneys1 fees is Section 17. That section is entitled 
"Indemnity" and relates to Stacey's indemnification of 
cross-appellants for expenses (including attorneys1 fees) 
incurred by cross-appellants in response to third party 
claims. Section 17 does not entitle cross-appellants to 
recover fees incurred in enforcing their rights under the 
agreement against Stacey. Therefore, there being no 
provision in the note or the letter agreement authorizing 
the award of fees to cross-appellants, the district court 
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properly concluded that cross-appellants were not entitled 
to recover any of their fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Cross-appellants Were More Than Adequately Compensated 
By the District Court's Awards Relating to the Post 
Office Air Conditioner and Roof. 
Recognizing that the amount of damages awarded by the 
trial court are largely discretionary, and that such awards 
are not reversible on appeal in the absence of a showing of 
an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice,1 Stacey chose 
not to include the issue of the damage awards in its already 
lengthy appeal. However, Stacey has always believed that 
the district court did indeed abuse its discretion in 
several respects which resulted in respondents obtaining 
awards that in fact made them more than whole, and by which 
they were unjustly enriched. Respondents having raised in 
their cross-appeal the propriety of the district court's 
damage awards, this Court now possesses the power to modify 
or reverse those awards so as to conform with the 
requirements of justice, event if that action results in a 
benefit to Stacey. See, e.g., Kure v. Chevrolet Motor 
Division, 581 P.2d 603, 610 (Wyo. 1978) ("An appellate court 
1See, e.g., Mabey v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287, 
291 (Utah 1982) ("In fixing damages, the trial court is 
vested with broad discretion, and the award will not be set 
aside unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the 
trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was influenced 
by prejudice or other extraneous circumstances.11); Clayton 
v. Crossroads, 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1981). 
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has the power and duty to make such ultimate disposition of 
the case as justice requires"). 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Awarding Respondents a Percentage of the Cost of Replacing 
the Post Office Air Conditioner Unit. 
With the exception of a few specific warranties, 
respondents agreed that they had inspected the post office 
and purchased it "as is." (Letter Agreement, page 1). That 
language had the effect of disclaiming any implied 
warranties relating to the air conditioners, such as their 
being fit for the purposes for which cross-appellants' 
intended. See, e.g., Tibbets v. Openshaw, 425 P.2d 160, 
161-62, n. 1 (Utah 1967); Annot. 97 A.L.R.2d 849. Stacey's 
only express warranty relating to the air conditioning unit 
was as follows: "We represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at 
the property are in working order and will be operative at 
closing." (Letter Agreement, page 2) (emphasis added). 
Although the warranty language is clear, it must be 
emphasized that Stacey did not warrant the operability or 
condition of the air conditioning units for one day beyond 
the date of closing, May 22, 1984. Cross-appellants bore 
all the risk under the agreement that the units would not 
"hold out" beyond the date of closing, particularly in light 
of their purchasing the property "as is," and knowing that 
they were purchasing old equipment. 
- 8 -
If cross-appellants wished to expand the scope or the 
term of the warranty concerning the air conditioning unitsf 
it was incumbent upon them to have performed a routine 
inspection that would have revealed the probable life 
expectancy of the units and then to have demanded some kind 
of concession based upon their condition from Stacey. Such 
inspections are routinely required for the protection of 
buyers of residential properties. As experienced buyers of 
large commercial properties, respondents can claim no excuse 
for their failure to obtain an adequate inspection of the 
properties purchased by them. Respondents knowingly bought 
a used car without even checking its condition and should 
9 
not now be heard to claim they bought a lemon. 
Cross-appellants presented absolutely no evidence that 
the air conditioning unit was not operable or in working 
order at the date of closing on May 22, 1984. Indeed, the 
evidence that the unit was operable during the summer of 
1983 (TR-59; Exhibit D-7), and was started for the 1984 
season by post office personnel either on May 19, or May 26, 
1984 with no report of a problem until May 29, 1984, is 
zStacey does not for a minute suggest that the east 
air conditioning unit was a lemon. To the contraryf even 
cross appellants1 own expert agreed that the unit was a good 
one when purchased and it "held-out" for at least eight 
years before cross-appellants purchased it. (TR-216) 
However, even if the unit was a "lemon" that does not change 
the nature of the limited warranty given by Stacey, absent 
some showing of a fraudulent omission on Stacey's part. 
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circumstantial evidence that the unit was indeed operable 
and in working order on May 22, 1984. 
Additionally, even if the unit was not in working order 
and operable on May 22, 1984, the uncontroverted evidence 
shows that the unit was repaired by the Holbrook Company on 
June 26, 1984 at a cost of $1,030.34, and that the unit was 
operable and in working order after that repair. (See, 
TR-139; 166; 175-76; 181; 218; Exhibit P-25a; Exhibit 
D-7). There is no evidence that the unit did not remain 
operable after the June 26 repair until July 25, 1984. (See 
TR-140; 219). Thus if Stacey did breach its limited 
warranty, the proper amount of damages awardable to 
respondents is only $1,030.34, the amount necessary to make 
the unit operable. 
The district court recognized that cross-appellants 
were seeking a windfall by attempting to offset the full 
cost of a brand new air conditioner against their note 
payments (TR-582; Findings and Conclusions at 1113(a)(2)). 
Therefore, the court attempted to fashion a remedy that was 
based upon the typical "useful life" of the air conditioner 
that cross-appellants replaced. That method would have made 
good sense if Stacey had warranted, expressly or impliedly, 
that the air conditioner would function for its typical 
useful life; however, the court's approach completely 
disregarded that Staceyfs only warranty was that the unit 
- 10 -
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would be operable and in working order on May 22, 1984. Cf. 
J.R. Stone Co.y Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 
1978) ("The sound and generally recognized rule is that a 
party to a contract is entitled to whatever rights are 
granted therein, including time limitations"). 
In light of that warranty, and assuming Stacey breached 
that warranty, the only proper measure of damages was the 
cost required to make the unit "operable" -- $1,030.39. 
That is the only amount which placed cross-appellants in the 
same position they would have been in if there were no 
breach. See e.g., Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 
(Utah 1982) ("Damages are properly measured by the amount 
necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract would have been performed"); 
Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 
1981). Any amount of offset allowed beyond $1,030.39 
constituted a windfall to cross-appellants. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the offset award 
relating to the east air conditioning unit and hold (1) that 
cross-appellants are entitled to no offset because there was 
no evidence that the air conditioning unit was not operable 
and in working order at closing; or (2) that cross-
appellants are entitled only to an offset in the amount of 
$1,030.39. 
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B. The District Court Applied an Unjust Standard to 
Arrive at Stacey1s Share for the Cost of Replacing the Post 
Office Roof. 
Again, regarding the post office roof, cross-appellants 
agreed that they purchased the roof after having "inspected" 
it and with the assumption that the roof was approximately 
thirteen years old. (See Letter Agreement at p. 1; 
TR-452). Again, cross-appellants purchased the roof "as is" 
and therefore received no implied warranty from Stacey as to 
its fitness or condition. See Tibbets v. Openshaw, supra. 
Additionally, unlike the roofs on the other properties sold, 
Stacey made no express warranties whatsoever concerning the 
condition of the roof. See Letter Agreement at p. 2. 
Stacey only agreed to make repairs "reasonably required" to 
maintain a water tight roof surface for sixty-seven 
months. In light of Staceyfs repair obligation, limited in 
duration to sixty-seven months, Judge Roth was plainly 
correct in concluding that Stacey should not be held 
responsible for the full cost of replacing the roof with a 
brand new twenty year roof. An award of that nature would 
have clearly given cross-appellants not only a windfall, but 
an enormous one. ^ 
Although Stacey made a heroic effort for two years to 
keep the roof in a water tight condition, and repaired every 
leak that ever occurred on the roof, Judge Roth concluded 
that the roof simply needed to be replaced. In light of 
- 12 -
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Judge Roth's conclusion, Stacey concedes that cross-
appellants were entitled to some compensation from Stacey 
for the loss of the value of Stacey1 s remaining repair 
obligation. However, Judge Roth erred in failing to 
calculate that compensation based upon the value of Stacey1s 
remaining repair obligation of forty-three months (sixty-
seven months minus twenty-four months) and instead based his 
calculation upon the full period of the repair obligation 
set forth in the letter agreement (sixty-seven months). 
As has been noted, Judge Roth concluded from the 
evidence presented by cross-appellants that a new twenty 
year roof would cost $49,000. Reasoning that the duration 
of Staceyfs repair obligation under the agreement (sixty-
seven months) was approximately twenty-five percent of 
twenty years (240 months), he awarded respondents twenty-
five percent of $49,000, or $12,250.00. 
That calculation however gave Stacey no credit for the 
considerable expenses incurred by it during the twenty-four 
month period prior to trial during which Stacey repaired the 
roof and during which cross-appellants incurred absolutely 
no expenses. Justice requires that Judge Roth's 
calculations be adjusted as follows: 
Cost of twenty year roof: $49,000.00 
Stacey1s remaining warranty: 43 months 
Remaining warranty as percentage 
of twenty years (43 divided by 240): 18% 
- 13 -
18% of $49,000 $8,820 
Therefore, the damage award relating to the post office 
roof should be reduced from $12,250 to $8,820.3 
II. Section 17 of the Letter Agreement Does Not Entitle 
Cross-Appellants to an Award of Their Attorneys' Fees. 
Cross-appellants recognize that the promissory note 
contains no provision authorizing their recovery against 
Stacey of attorneys1 fees incurred in enforcing their offset 
rights. As has been noted in Staceyfs appeal, the note only 
provides for the award of fees and costs to Stacey. 
Therefore, cross-appellants must look elsewhere for a basis 
from which to argue their entitlement to fees. 
Although cross-appellants contend that Section 17 of 
the letter agreement constitutes such a basis, that 
provision simply does not constitute an agreement by Stacey 
to pay cross-appellants1 fees incurred in litigation with 
Stacey. Section 17 is expressly labeled "Indemnity" and 
relates to Stacey1s indemnification of cross-appellants for 
JAlthough cross-appellants presented evidence 
concerning the cost of replacing both a twenty year roof and 
a fifteen year roof and Judge Roth utilized the cost of a 
twenty year roof in his calculations, cross-appellants now 
argue that the cost associated with a fifteen year roof 
should be utilized. Cross-appellants make that argument 
only because such would result in a higher award against 
Stacey under the calculation made by Judge Roth. Cross-
appellants should be required to live with the evidence 
presented by them, rather than manipulating it on appeal to 
Staceyfs detriment. 
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expenses or damages (including attorneys1 fees) sustained by 
them in regard to claims asserted against them by third 
parties. 
Although Section 17 does not expressly refer to third 
parties, the district court agreed with Stacey that the 
provision was properly interpreted to apply only to the 
claims of third parties. (See Transcript of Post-Trial 
Hearing of July 11, 1986 at p. 21). The most cross-
appellants can argue is that Section 17 is ambiguous; in 
light of that ambiguity, cross-appellants presented 
absolutely no evidence at trial that the provision was 
intended to constitute an "attorneys1 fee" agreement between 
Stacey and cross-appellants that should apply to this 
litigation. 
Contrary to Section 17, the note contains a clear and 
unambiguous fee provision running only to the benefit of 
Stacey. That, along with the note having been executed in 
conjunction with Section 17, constitutes circumstantial 
evidence that the parties did not intend to create an 
attorneys' fee provision in cross-appellants' favor in this 
matter. 
Finally, if Section 17 is held to constitute an 
agreement by Stacey to pay cross-appellants' attorneys' fees 
incurred relating to their enforcement of the letter 
agreement, the agreement must be limited to cross-appellants 
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expenses herein regarding their breach of contract claims, 
rather than their offset claims asserted under the terms of 
the promissory note. Similarly, those fees should be 
reduced to account for Stacey*s almost complete success in 
defending against the breach of warranty claims.4 See 
Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Cross-appellants1 arguments asserted in their cross-
appeal demonstrate that the district court was extremely 
generous to them. Far from under-compensating them, the 
district court granted cross-appellants windfalls to which 
they were not entitled. To the extent cross-appellants were 
over-compensated, this Court should consider the effect of 
that over-compensation on Staceyfs right to acceleration; if 
the district court erred in respect to either the air 
conditioning offset or the roof damages, then Stacey is 
without any doubt entitled to accelerate the note, 
regardless of the "offset" and "damages" distinction 
discussed in Stacey1s appeal, as cross-appellants' recovery, 
whether in offset or damages, would then be less than the 
accrued installments owing. 
4The only breach of warranty claim upon which 
cross-appellants were even partially successful was relating 
to the post office roof. 
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